Getting It Right Isn’t Enough: The Appellate Court’s Role in Procedural Justice by Leben, Steve
 
13 
Getting It Right Isn’t Enough: The Appellate 
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Steve Leben* 
INTRODUCTION 
We all know—or surely can sense—that distrust of institutions, 
including the government, is riding high.  While that distrust isn’t focused 
on judges and the legal system, it hasn’t excluded them, either.  Tribalism 
is the order of the day; judges are increasingly either on “our” team or 
“their” team.  And respect for “their” team is hard to find. 
Yet respect for the legal system is a key to its ability to work.  For the 
most part, we don’t send out sheriff’s deputies or federal marshals to 
enforce court orders.  We instead rely on voluntary compliance.  And 
voluntary compliance relies on litigants having sufficient respect for the 
judicial system’s legitimacy that they will comply with its orders. 
At the trial-court level, as judges handle cases and litigants are often 
present, decades of social-science research has shown that adherence to 
procedural-justice principles leads to litigant and public acceptance of the 
legitimacy of judges and courts.  Yet only two articles have focused 
specifically on ways appellate courts might apply these principles.1 
This Article explains how and why appellate courts should focus on 
procedural-justice principles.  The “why” is presented in two parts: (1) the 
public’s opinion of courts and judges today, which reflects distrust and a 
sense of partisanship that undermine court legitimacy; and (2) the 
application of procedural-justice principles, which has been shown to 
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improve perceptions of legitimacy in the courts.  After explaining “why” 
they should do so, the article shows “how” appellate courts can apply 
procedural-justice principles throughout the appellate process. 
I.    WHY WE MUST DO MORE: THE PUBLIC’S SENSE THAT THE COURTS 
ARE LEGITIMATE IS AT RISK. 
There has been a general loss of confidence in institutions in the 
United States over the past few decades.  Gallup has asked about 
confidence in seven institutions from 1973 to the present: organized 
religion, public schools, the Supreme Court, Congress, newspapers, 
organized labor, and big business.2  Respondents rate their confidence as 
a great deal, quite a lot, some, very little, or none, with Gallup considering 
“a great deal” and “quite a lot” as expressions of confidence.3  The average 
confidence among those seven institutions ranged from 44% to 46% from 
1973 to 1976, fell to 32% in 1991 before rebounding to 38% in 2001, and 
more recently has settled in at about 27% from 2007 to 2019.4  In 2020, 
during the Covid-19 pandemic, confidence rose sharply for schools (with 
the percentage having a “great deal” or “quite a lot” of confidence rising 
from 29% to 41%) but changed little for the other seven institutions 
polled.5 
This loss of confidence in institutions is not only well documented by 
survey-research firms but also recognized by the public.  More than three-
quarters of adults say that compared to 20 years ago Americans are less 
confident in the federal government.6 
There’s no reason to think that this loss of confidence focuses on 
courts or judges.  In the Gallup survey, confidence in the United States 
Supreme Court declined only 5 percentage points from 1973 to 2020, 
while confidence in Congress declined by 29 percentage points and 
 
 2.   Confidence in Institutions, GALLUP, https://news.gallup.com/poll/1597/confidence-
institutions.aspx [https://perma.cc/VG3C-6G2Z] (last visited Oct. 11, 2020) (showing annual data 
through 2020). 
 3.   See id.  
 4.   Lydia Saad, Military, Small Business, Police Still Stir Most Confidence, GALLUP (June 28, 
2018), https://news.gallup.com/poll/236243/military-small-business-police-stir-confidence.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/T8D2-SA5C]; Confidence in Institutions, supra note 2.   
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(Aug. 12, 2020), https://news.gallup.com/poll/317135/amid-pandemic-confidence-key-institutions-
surges.aspx [https://perma.cc/AXK6-8UCL] (noting rise in confidence in public schools and the 
medical system while confidence in other institutions was largely unchanged). 
 6.   In a Pew Research Center survey taken in November and December 2018, 75% of 
respondents said that the level of trust in the federal government had been shrinking.  Lee Rainie, Scott 
Keeter & Andrew Perrin, Trust and Distrust in America, PEW RSCH. CTR. (July 22, 2019), 
https://www.people-press.org/2019/07/22/trust-and-distrust-in-america/ [https://perma.cc/7SWM-
M84U].  
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confidence in organized religion dropped by 23 points.7  But confidence 
in courts, judges, and the criminal-justice system has fallen too.  And 
judges and lawyers need to know about it because it affects the way they 
should interact with court participants and the public. 
Let’s start with individual attorneys and judges.  Most of them deal 
with clients, litigants, witnesses, and others one at a time.  Perhaps there’s 
a reservoir of trust for lawyers and judges as individuals in these one-on-
one meetings. 
Unfortunately, that’s not the case.  Gallup has a survey question it 
regularly asks about various professions: “Please tell me how you would 
rate the honesty and ethical standards of people in these different fields—
very high, high, average, low, or very low?”8  The last time the survey 
included both judges and lawyers was December 2017.9  Only 43% said 
judges had high or very high standards for honesty and ethics; the number 
for lawyers was 18%.10  Judges were between day-care providers (46%) 
and auto mechanics (32%); lawyers were only a few points above 
members of Congress (11%) and lobbyists (8%).11  Leading the pack were 
nurses (82%), military officers (71%), grade-school teachers (66%), and 
medical doctors (65%).12  So it’s not impossible to score well on a rating 
of honesty and ethics.13 
But when you realize that judges and lawyers have special training in 
law and ethics—and codes of conduct that govern our behavior—judges 
and lawyers don’t do nearly as well as they would surely hope to do.  And 
views of judges, like trust in institutions, are moving in the wrong 
direction.  The percentage rating judges’ honesty and ethics as high or very 
high dropped from 53% in 1999 to 43% in 2017.14  For lawyers, the picture 
has been fairly poor for decades, with those rating honesty and ethics high 
or very high ranging over the past three decades from a high of 27% in 
 
 7.   Confidence in Institutions, supra note 2 (comparing combined percentage of respondents 
with “a great deal” or “quite a lot” of confidence in the institution). 
 8.   Megan Brenan, Nurses Keep Healthy Lead as Most Honest, Ethical Profession, GALLUP 
(Dec. 26, 2017), https://news.gallup.com/poll/224639/nurses-keep-healthy-lead-honest-ethical-
profession.aspx [https://perma.cc/7JUX-4VY9].  For historical trends for all the professions Gallup 
tracks, see Honesty/Ethics in Professions, GALLUP, https://news.gallup.com/poll/1654/honesty-ethics-
professions.aspx [https://perma.cc/T6Q8-AUZR] (last visited Oct. 11, 2020). 
 9.   See Honesty/Ethics in Professions, supra note 8.  
 10.   Brenan, supra note 8. 
 11.   Id. 
 12.   Id.  
 13.   Nurses continue to score well (85% “high” or “very high”) while lawyers do not (22% 
“high” or “very high”) in the most recent Gallup survey.  See RJ Reinhart, Nurses Continue to Rate 
Highest in Honesty, Ethics, GALLUP (Jan. 6, 2020), https://news.gallup.com/poll/274673/nurses-
continue-rate-highest-honesty-ethics.aspx [https://perma.cc/B9P3-SQLM]. 
 14.   Honesty/Ethics in Professions, supra note 8. 
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1985 to a low of 13% in 1999 and 2009 to 22% in 2019.15 
When we broaden our view to the institutional level, the United States 
Supreme Court is often considered the bellwether for the court system.  
But approval ratings for the Supreme Court have changed dramatically 
since its 2000 decision in Bush v. Gore,16 the five-to-four ruling that 
decided the 2000 presidential election. 
Gallup regularly asks respondents whether they “approve or 
disapprove of the way the Supreme Court is handling its job.”17  The 
overall numbers show a decline in approval and an increase in 
disapproval.18  In fall 2000, shortly before Bush v. Gore, 62% approved 
and 29% disapproved; in fall 2019, 54% approved and 42% disapproved.19  
But twice during that time period approval dipped to 42%.20  Even so, in 
2019 and 2020, the Court had a net-positive approval number.21 
But behind the overall numbers are several divides.  First, there’s a 
racial divide.  Gallup reports separate figures for whites and non-whites, 
with 2020 approval at 61% for whites and 52% for non-whites.22  A 2019 
Pew survey showed Blacks and Hispanics generally had lower general 
trust levels in other people, which correlated with lower trust in 
institutions.23  There’s also a persistent divide by race in views of the 
criminal-justice system, with Blacks more than twice as likely as whites 
to attribute higher incarceration rates for Black men to discrimination.24 
Second, a gender divide emerged in Gallup’s September 2018 
 
 15.   Id. 
 16.   531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
 17.   Supreme Court, GALLUP, https://news.gallup.com/poll/4732/supreme-court.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/CAQ9-3YZM] (last visited Oct. 11, 2020). 
 18.   Id. 
 19.   Id.  
 20.   Id.  In July 2016, disapproval led approval 52% to 42%.  And in June 2005, disapproval led 
approval 48% to 42%.  Id. 
 21.   Id.  See also Justin McCarthy, Approval of the Supreme Court Is Highest Since 2009, 
GALLUP (Aug. 5, 2020) [hereinafter McCarthy, Approval of the Supreme Court Is Highest Since 2009], 
https://news.gallup.com/poll/316817/approval-supreme-court-highest-2009.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/QB5X-UBWE]. 
 22.   Jeff Jones & Lydia Saad, July Wave 1, GALLUP 3 (July 1–23, 2020), 
https://news.gallup.com/poll/316844/americans-views-supreme-court.aspx [https://perma.cc/AM7V-
D54J] (last visited Oct. 11, 2020) (data available through link to “Download File 
200806SupremeCourt.pdf”).  
 23.   See Rainie et al., supra note 6. 
 24.   Frank Newport, Gallup Review: Black and White Attitudes Toward Police, GALLUP (Aug. 
20, 2014), https://news.gallup.com/poll/175088/gallup-review-black-white-attitudes-toward-
police.aspx [https://perma.cc/E6PZ-4MQU].  In the 2013 survey, only 19% of whites attributed the 
greater incidence of Black males going to prison compared to whites as “mostly due to discrimination,” 
while 50% of Blacks said it was.  Id.  Newport reported that Gallup surveys had shown a “racial gap 
in confidence in police . . . throughout the past decade and a half that Gallup has been measuring these 
trends on an annual basis.”  Id.  
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Supreme Court approval survey, taken after the confirmation of Justice 
Brett Kavanaugh.  From 2000 through 2017, approval rates by men and 
women were quite similar.  In 2000, approval by men was 59% and 
approval by women 60%; in 2017, approval by men was 50% and approval 
by women 49%.25  But in 2018, approval by men had risen to 60% and 
approval by women had fallen to 43%.26  It’s not fair, though, to attribute 
the gap only to Kavanaugh’s nomination.  Gallup had done an additional 
2018 survey in July, and a 9-point gap was already in place mostly before 
Kavanaugh was nominated.27  And the September data came before 
sexual-assault allegations against Kavanaugh became public.28  As of 
Gallup’s September 2019 survey, a 12-point gender gap remained in 
place.29 
Third, a partisan divide emerged after Bush v. Gore.  Overall approval 
of the Court was at 62% in September 2000,30 and the approval rate of 
Democrats was only slightly higher than that of Republicans as the eight-
year Clinton presidency ended.31  But after Bush v. Gore, Republican 
approval shot up to 80% and Democratic approval fell to 42%.32  Since 
then, the views of partisans on both sides have swung dramatically as the 
White House changed hands (changing public perception of where the 
Court might head) or major decisions were announced in cases involving 
the Affordable Care Act or LGBTQ+ rights.33  Republican approval fell to 
a low of 18% in 2015 after the Court had upheld same-sex marriage rights 
and the Affordable Care Act.34  Democratic approval in 2015 rose to 
76%.35  But with the confirmation of two appointees of President Trump, 
Republican approval had rebounded by 2019 to 73% while Democratic 
 
 25.   Justin McCarthy, Women’s Approval of SCOTUS Matches 13-Year Low Point, GALLUP 
(Sept. 28, 2018) [hereinafter McCarthy, Women’s Approval of  
SCOTUS], https://news.gallup.com/poll/243266/women-approval-scotus-matches-year-low-
point.aspx [https://perma.cc/9VM2-6XAH].  
 26.   Id. 
 27.   See id. 
 28.   Id. 
 29.   See Jeff Jones & Lydia Saad, Gallup Poll Social Series: Governance, GALLUP 4 (Sept. 3–
15, 2019), https://news.gallup.com/poll/267158/supreme-court-enjoys-majority-approval-start-new-
term.aspx [https://perma.cc/NZ5Q-NKEX] (data available at end of article through “View complete 
question responses and trends” link).  
 30.   Supreme Court, supra note 17.  
 31.   Justin McCarthy, GOP Approval of Supreme Court Surges, Democrats’ Slides, GALLUP 
(Sept. 28, 2017) [hereinafter McCarthy, GOP Approval of Supreme Court Surges], 
https://news.gallup.com/poll/219974/gop-approval-supreme-court-surges-democrats-slides.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/TTB3-6E8Y].  
 32.   Id. 
 33.   See id. 
 34.   Id. 
 35.   Id. 
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approval had fallen to 38%.36 
If it’s true that the judiciary—the least dangerous branch—must rely 
in some measure on public support, these numbers are troubling.  Two 
writers at FiveThirtyEight.com, a website that tracks public opinion, 
argued in 2018 that the Supreme Court was “in a weaker position now than 
at nearly any point in modern history.”37  Large swaths of the public have 
significant doubts about our nation’s highest court.38  And at this point, it’s 
hard to see how that might change or when significant change could occur.  
Racial and ethnic divisions—and inequality—have been present 
throughout our history, of course.  Gender equity has had its own historic 
journey, one that has not yet reached fruition.  But the partisan divide that 
now pervades public discourse is its own threat to court legitimacy. 
There’s a caveat about these reports of division—some of them went 
away, at least temporarily, in Gallup’s 2020 survey, which was taken 
shortly after the Court’s October 2019 Term ended this July, during the 
Covid-19 pandemic but before Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s September 
18, 2020 death.39 
This year’s survey didn’t show either a partisan divide or one based 
on gender.  Approval was roughly the same for Republicans (60%), 
Democrats (56%), and Independents (57%), just as it was for men (55%) 
and women (60%).40  Because these results differed from past surveys—
especially the partisan divide that had persisted since 2000—one would 
presume the shift reflects decisions made by the Court this Term.  There 
were high-profile decisions that may have led to similar approval scores 
by people on each side of these divides.  Decisions late in the Term 
included protecting LGBT workers from employment discrimination41 and 
rejecting President Donald Trump’s attempt to end the Deferred Action 
for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program.42  On abortion, the Court upheld 
 
 36.   Lydia Saad, Supreme Court Enjoys Majority Approval at Start of New Term, GALLUP (Oct. 
2, 2019), https://news.gallup.com/poll/267158/supreme-court-enjoys-majority-approval-start-new-
term.aspx [https://perma.cc/3CUE-H8NX].  For Pew Center data on the partisan divide, see Claire 
Brockway & Bradley Jones, Partisan Gap Widens in Views of the Supreme Court, PEW RSCH. CTR. 
(Aug. 7, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/08/07/partisan-gap-widens-in-views-of-
the-supreme-court/ [https://perma.cc/K2RG-SS82].  In the Pew data, 81% of Democrats and 76% of 
Republicans had a favorable view of the Supreme Court in 1997.  Id.  In 2019, 75% of Republicans 
had a favorable view but only 49% of Democrats did.  Id. 
 37.   Amelia Thomson-DeVeaux & Oliver Roeder, Is the Supreme Court Facing a Legitimacy 
Crisis?, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Oct. 1, 2018, 6:00 AM), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/is-the-
supreme-court-facing-a-legitimacy-crisis/ [https://perma.cc/JL8L-Z6KE].  
 38.   See id.  
 39.   McCarthy, Approval of the Supreme Court is Highest Since 2009, supra note 21. 
 40.   Id.; Jones & Saad, July Wave 1, supra note 22, at 3. 
 41.   Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1737 (2020).   
 42.   DHS v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891, 1901 (2020).   
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abortion rights but did so in a case in which Chief Justice Roberts, whose 
vote was pivotal to the five-member majority, announced in a concurring 
opinion a test that some thought would allow greater abortion restrictions 
going forward.43  The net result of the Term’s opinions left approval by 
Republicans and men stable while lifting the approval level by women, 
Democrats, and Independents.44 
At least for the partisan divide, which had been in place since 2000, 
it’s hard to see how and why that partisan divide would dissipate on any 
permanent basis.  A 2019 Pew report found the partisan divide an 
increasingly personal one, with increasing percentages on each side 
finding members of the opposing party closed-minded or immoral.45  In 
the Pew survey, a majority of both Republicans and Democrats said that 
even on nonpolitical matters, members of the other party probably don’t 
share many of their other values and goals.46  While the high-profile 
rulings near the end of the October 2019 Term may have resonated, though 
for different reasons, with both Republicans and Democrats, that may not 
play out the same way again. 
When we move our focus away from any single survey and return to 
look at the bigger picture, we still find diminished trust in institutions 
generally.  We have large segments of the public with serious doubts about 
the nation’s highest court.47  And, for the most part, we have a partisan 
divide that in most recent years leads one side or the other to have a 
stronger disapproval of the Court than had been the case before Bush v. 
Gore and our recent hyper-partisanship.48  As this Article was being 
edited, intense partisan warfare had taken place over the replacement of 
the Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Amy Coney Barrett had just been 
confirmed.49  It seems unlikely that the partisan divide in Court approval 
 
 43.   June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103, 2139 (2020).  See also Melissa Murray, 
The Supreme Court’s Abortion Decision Seems Pulled from the ‘Casey’ Playbook, WASH. POST (June 
29, 2020, 7:51 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/06/29/problem-with-relying-
precedent-protect-abortion-rights/ [https://perma.cc/38TH-ATVX].   
 44.   See McCarthy, Approval of the Supreme Court Is Highest Since 2009, supra note 21; Jones 
& Saad, July Wave 1, supra note 22, at 3. 
 45.   Partisan Antipathy: More Intense, More Personal, PEW RSCH. CTR.  
(Oct. 10, 2019), https://www.people-press.org/2019/10/10/partisan-antipathy-more-intense-more-
personal/ [https://perma.cc/E9KW-Z6DE].  
 46.   Id.   
 47.   See Supreme Court, supra note 17.  
 48.   See, e.g., McCarthy, GOP Approval of Supreme Court Surges, supra note 31. 
 49.   See, e.g., Ron Elving, Partisan Reaction to Loss of Ginsburg Shows How Much Else Has 
Been Lost, NPR (Sept. 22, 2020, 10:35 PM), https://www.npr.org/2020/09/22/915152430/partisan-
reaction-to-loss-of-ginsburg-shows-how-much-else-has-been-lost [https://perma.cc/PY2S-V3X9]; 
Barbara Sprunt, Amy Coney Barrett Confirmed to Supreme Court, Takes Constitutional Oath, NPR 
(Oct. 26, 2020, 8:07 PM), https://www.npr.org/2020/10/26/927640619/senate-confirms-amy-coney-
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ratings will not return in 2021. 
For individual judges, two surveys from the Annenberg Public Policy 
Center tell us something useful too.  In surveys about courts and judges, 
they asked questions about whether certain things influenced a state 
judge’s rulings.50  When asked whether a judge’s ruling “is influenced by 
his or her personal political views,” 75% said that either to a “Great extent” 
or a “Moderate extent” they were.51  When asked whether a judge’s ruling 
would be affected by a “desire to be promoted to a higher court,” 75% said 
it would be.52 
Of course, not every judge is even interested in being promoted to a 
higher court.  And political views wouldn’t be of much importance in 
deciding whether a driver had been speeding or had run through a stop 
sign.  But these questions, like a push poll,53 suggest something to the 
respondent.  With judges, these responses suggest that the public has little 
enough contact with judges that respondents are willing to believe just 
about anything that might be said about the judge.  That could easily be a 
problem if, for example, the attorney who lost a case suggested to their 
client that the judge had a bias or was known for a lack of knowledge about 
the law or made some other claim that would undermine court legitimacy.  
Or if a judge’s own comment suggested a bias.  Such things could be true 
in some cases, but these surveys suggest that people are open to 
suggestions of possible judicial bias.  Judges don’t enter the courtroom 
with a strong reservoir of trust and legitimacy that can be drawn upon.  For 
those who judge the judges—litigants, attorneys, and the general public—




barrett-to-the-supreme-court [https://perma.cc/X466-7R3E]; Opinion, The Republican Party’s 
Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 26, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/26/opinion/amy-
coney-barrett-supreme-court.html [https://perma.cc/8BTC-HTKM]. 
 50.   2007 Annenberg Public Policy Center Judicial Survey: Exact Question Wording, By 
Category, ANNENBERG PUB. POL’Y CTR. 5–6, 
https://cdn.annenbergpublicpolicycenter.org/Downloads/20071017_JudicialSurvey/Survey_Question
s_10-17-2007.pdf [https://perma.cc/3GCD-9Z4C] (last visited Oct. 12, 2020); Kathleen Hall Jamieson 
& Michael Hennessy, Public Understanding of and Support for the Courts: Survey Results, 95 GEO. 
L.J. 899, 899, 901 (2007). 
 51.   See 2007 Annenberg Survey, supra note 50, at 5. 
 52.   Jamieson & Hennessy, supra note 50, at 901.   
 53.   Push polls, often encountered during political campaigns, are “a form of negative 
campaigning that is disguised as a political poll.”  What Is a “Push” Poll?,  
AM. ASS’N FOR PUB. OPINION RSCH., https://www.aapor.org/ 
Education-Resources/Resources/What-is-a-Push-Poll.aspx [https://perma.cc/5GW6-VF3X] (last 
visited Oct. 11, 2020).  For example, a telemarketing firm tells the respondent they are participating 
in survey research but presents information designed to “push” the respondent to a particular side.   
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II.  THE APPLICATION OF PROCEDURAL-JUSTICE PRINCIPLES LEADS TO 
A GREATER SENSE OF COURT LEGITIMACY BY LITIGANTS AND THE 
PUBLIC. 
If the bad news is that an overall lack of trust includes courts and 
judges, the good news is that there is a proven way to improve trust within 
the court system.  And that way is adherence to procedural-justice 
principles.  The research into its effectiveness is so persuasive that 
researcher David Rottman of the National Center for State Courts called 
procedural justice “the organizing theory for which 21st-century court 
reform has been waiting.”54 
Because the term “procedural justice” can have different meanings in 
different contexts and in different academic fields, we should first define 
the term as it is being used here.  Procedural justice is sometimes used to 
refer to procedural due process, a legal concept all lawyers know about.  
But what’s discussed here comes mainly out of the work of social 
psychologists who have looked to see what procedures lead a person to 
think an authority figure has dealt with them fairly and how being dealt 
with fairly changes a person’s views about the authority figure.55  One 
commentator has defined procedural justice as the proposition that 
“providing fair and transparent court procedures would result in greater 
satisfaction and compliance regardless of the substantive outcome of their 
case.”56 
Within that context, let’s review the basic principles of procedural 
justice.  They come from research about how court procedures and actors 
shape the judgments people make about the courts.  Researchers vary in 
the way they label the key factors.57  But social psychologist Tom Tyler, 
the most-cited scholar in this area, has settled on four key things that lead 
to greater perceptions of fairness in court proceedings: 
1. Voice: litigants’ ability to participate in the case by expressing their 
viewpoint before decisions about them are made; 
 
 54.   David B. Rottman, Procedural Fairness as a Court Reform Agenda, 44 CT. REV. 32, 32 
(2007–2008).   
 55.   For a discussion of the differences between procedural justice in the legal and psychological 
literature, see Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, The Psychology of Procedural Justice in the Federal 
Courts, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 127, 132–42 (2011).   
 56.   Lynn Mather, Law and Society, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LAW AND POLITICS 681, 
691–92 (Keith E. Whittington, R. Daniel Kelemen & Gregory A. Caldeira eds., 2008).  Mather notes 
that Tom Tyler’s work has “generated a large body of research testing this idea, and finding 
considerable support.”  Id. at 692. 
 57.   See TOM R. TYLER, ROBERT J. BOECKMANN, HEATHER J. SMITH & YUEN J. HUO, SOCIAL 
JUSTICE IN A DIVERSE SOCIETY 87–94 (1997) (comparing procedural-justice criteria used by leading 
researchers).   
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2. Neutrality: consistently applied legal principles, unbiased decision 
makers, and a transparency about how decisions are made; 
3. Respect: treating individuals with dignity and explicitly protecting 
their rights; and 
4. Trust: authorities are benevolent, caring, and sincerely trying to 
help the litigants—a trust garnered by listening to individuals and by 
explaining or justifying decisions that address the litigants’ needs.58 
At least in the state-court system, a consensus has emerged that courts 
should work to meet these procedural-justice objectives.  The American 
Judges Association, a group made up mainly of state-court judges, 
approved a white paper urging greater attention to procedural justice in 
2007.59  The Conference of State Court Administrators  (COSCA) 
(representing the administrative leaders of the state courts) endorsed the 
paper in 2008,60 and the Conference of Chief Justices (CCJ) (representing 
all state chief justices in the United States) joined in 2013.61  A joint CCJ–
COSCA resolution in 2013 urged that state courts integrate procedural 
justice into judicial-education programs, practice procedural-justice 
principles in the treatment of court personnel, and measure litigant 
satisfaction in part based on procedural-justice principles.62 
The basis for this wide acceptance is an extensive literature 
demonstrating the importance of procedural justice (also known in this 
context as procedural fairness).  Researchers have convincingly shown 
that the public’s view of the justice system is driven more by how they are 
treated by the courts than whether they win or lose their particular case.63  
 
 58.   Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice and the Courts, 44 CT. REV. 26, 30–31 (2007–2008) 
[hereinafter Tyler, Procedural Justice]; Tom R. Tyler & Justin Sevier, How Do the Courts Create 
Popular Legitimacy?: The Role of Establishing the Truth, Punishing Justly, and/or Acting Through 
Just Procedures, 77 ALB. L. REV. 1095, 1105–07 (2014).   
 59.   The American Judges Association’s white paper was published in 2007 as Kevin Burke & 
Steve Leben, Procedural Fairness: A Key Ingredient in Public Satisfaction, 44 CT. REV. 4 (2007–
2008).   
 60.   Conf. of State Ct. Admins., Resolution 6: In Support of AJA White Paper on Procedural 
Justice (July 30, 2008), reprinted in 44 CT. REV. 47, 47 (2007–2008).   
 61.   Conf. of Chief Justices & Conf. of State Ct. Admins., Resolution 12: In Support of State 
Supreme Court Leadership to Promote Procedural Fairness, at 2  
(July 31, 2013), https://cosca.ncsc.org/__data/assets/pdf_file/0024/23694/07312013-support-state-
supreme-court-leadership-promote-procedural-fairness-ccj-cosca.pdf [https://perma.cc/9CSC-59RS].   
 62.   Id.  The resolution noted that several state courts had begun having judicial-education 
programs on procedural justice.  Id. at 1. 
 63.   See, e.g., David B. Rottman, Adhere to Procedural Fairness in the Justice System, 6 
CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 835, 838 (2007); TYLER ET AL., supra note 57, at 75–76; Jonathan D. 
Casper, Tom Tyler & Bonnie Fisher, Procedural Justice in Felony Cases, 22 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 483, 
483, 486–87, 504 (1988); Jason Sunshine & Tom R. Tyler, The Role of Procedural Justice and 
Legitimacy in Shaping Public Support for Policing, 37 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 513, 514–15 (2003) 
(testing the argument for police legitimacy); JOHN THIBAUT & LAURENS WALKER, PROCEDURAL 
JUSTICE: A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 67–96 (1975).   
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For example, an extensive study found that perceptions of procedural 
justice were “the strongest predictor by far” of public confidence in the 
California state-court system—if litigants or members of the public 
perceived that the court provided fair treatment in the aspects Tyler 
identified, their overall opinion of the court system was much more 
positive.64 
On top of this effect of improving overall satisfaction with the courts, 
adherence to procedural-justice principles has also been shown to lead to 
greater compliance with court orders.65  More broadly, studies link 
people’s judgments about the procedural fairness of proceedings to 
“decision adherence over time; rule-breaking behavior; well-being and 
recovery; and cooperation” with courts and police.66  Tyler’s studies trace 
these results back to the greater sense of legitimacy that an authority figure 
or institution gains through the use of procedural-justice principles.67 
These results are found even in some of the most difficult of legal 
proceedings, like domestic-violence cases.68  And while some 
demographic groups have less trust in institutions—including the 
judiciary—than others, the elements of procedural justice dominate 
people’s reactions to the legal system across ethnic groups, across gender, 
and across income and educational levels.69 
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4).pdf [https://perma.cc/E2CG-HGZM] (last visited Oct. 12, 2020); Katherine M. Kitzmann & Robert 
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Resolution, 17 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 553, 554–55 (1993); Tyler & Sevier, supra note 58, at 1101–02, 
1104–05.   
 66.   Tyler & Sevier, supra note 58, at 1101–02 (footnotes omitted).   
 67.   See id. at 1102–05.   
 68.   See Eckberg & Podkopacz, supra note 65, at 34–35.  See also Raymond Paternoster, Robert 
Brame, Ronet Bachman & Lawrence W. Sherman, Do Fair Procedures Matter? The Effect of 
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Since the readers of this Article are most likely lawyers and judges, a 
final point should be made about how the views of lawyers and judges 
differs from that of the general public.  In a California study that included 
both lawyers and the public (both with and without recent court 
experiences), researchers looked at the relationship between overall court 
approval and the respondents’ views about procedural justice.70  For the 
public, views about procedural justice (i.e., whether the courts handled 
cases through fair procedures) were more closely tied to overall approval 
of the California courts than whether the public thought the courts got the 
outcomes right.71  But for lawyers, the result was the opposite: lawyers’ 
overall approval of the courts was more closely tied to whether the lawyers 
thought courts got the outcomes right than whether cases were handled 
through fair procedures.72 
Why might that be?  Traditional law-school education focuses on 
outcomes; first-year students learn the holding of each case and work them 
into an outline of substantive legal rules.  In addition, of course, attorneys 
are more familiar with a court’s typical procedures and thus are less likely 
to feel lost during the process as the public may be.  But whatever the 
cause may be, attorneys may not be as attuned as the public is to how 
important procedural justice can be. 
A similar result showed up in a study of judges.73  A researcher had 
some federal appellate judges review police-citizen encounters raising 
Fourth Amendment issues.74  Half of the panel read about a search that had 
been done fairly, with polite police who had identified themselves and who 
had listened to the citizen’s side of the story.75 The other half read about a 
search conducted without much procedural justice: the officers had been 
rude, hadn’t initially identified themselves, and didn’t let the citizens 
explain their side.76  The judges recognized the differences in the 
scenarios, but that didn’t affect the way they decided the cases.77  
Psychologist Larry Heuer concluded that “the meaning of fairness among 
judges is considerably different . . . . [and] outcome concerns had a greater 
influence among judges than the procedural criteria of trust, neutrality, and 
 
 70.   Rottman, Trust and Confidence in the California Courts, supra note 64, at 24–30.   
 71.   Id. at 25.  
 72.   Id.  
 73.   See Larry Heuer, What’s Just About the Criminal Justice System? A Psychological 
Perspective, 13 J.L. & POL’Y 209, 214–18 (2005). 
 74.   Id. at 215–16. 
 75.   Id. at 216.  
 76.   Id.  
 77.   Id. at 216–17.   
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standing” that constitute the public’s understanding of procedural justice.78  
That may be a good thing with regard to judges getting the right legal 
ruling, but there’s room for considerable tension between the way lawyers 
and judges look at things (focused on rules and cold reality) and the way 
others do (focused on procedural fairness). 
Broadly, then, there’s extensive evidence that procedural justice leads 
to a greater sense of public legitimacy for judges and the courts, better 
acceptance of judicial decisions, and better compliance with court orders.  
There’s also a tendency among lawyers and judges to undervalue this 
impact. 
That tendency applies at the appellate level too.  The next section of 
this Article looks at how procedural justice is undervalued there, along 
with steps that could be taken to improve public perceptions of appellate 
courts. 
III.  STEPS APPELLATE COURTS CAN TAKE TO IMPROVE PROCEDURAL 
JUSTICE. 
Although we know that adhering to procedural-justice principles in 
general leads to improved legitimacy for the courts, the studies looking at 
this have been done either at the trial-court level or have looked mainly at 
overall satisfaction with a court system.  Other than public-opinion surveys 
about the United States Supreme Court, no published studies have tried to 
evaluate procedural justice in the appellate courts with data from 
appellate-court users. 
There’s reason to think that what appellate courts do would affect 
overall satisfaction with the court system.  If nothing else, appellate 
courts—especially state supreme courts and the United States Supreme 
Court—have much higher visibility than trial courts.  When a state 
supreme court rules that its state’s school-finance system is 
unconstitutional, that gets noticed.  And when the United States Supreme 
Court decides issues about abortion rights or marriage equality, that’s on 
every newscast. 
Despite this, only two prior articles appear to have focused on the 
application of procedural-justice principles to appellate courts.  In one, a 
former state chief justice and two court administrators applied procedural-
justice principles to suggest ways that state supreme courts might 
communicate more effectively with the public, both in their opinions and 
the way courts communicate with the public when their opinions are 
 
 78.   Id. at 217.   
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issued.79  Their suggestions include that courts write shorter opinions, 
make sure that a good summary is provided to the media (both in the 
opinion and separately), and explain the court’s role.80  In the other, a law 
professor found that a large percentage of the decisions of federal 
intermediate appellate courts consisted of very short opinions that were 
devoid of any reasoned explanation of the decision.81  Based on 
procedural-justice principles, she recommends that all opinions contain at 
least a summary of the key issues and relevant law, along with some 
application of that law to the facts.82 
There has also been some research in the related field of therapeutic 
jurisprudence.  That field was created through the work of law professors 
David Wexler and Bruce Winick.83  The essence of therapeutic 
jurisprudence is that encounters with the legal system “can produce 
therapeutic or antitherapeutic consequences” on those having the 
encounters.84  Wexler and Winick urge using behavioral-science insights 
to help the legal system produce the most therapeutic consequences 
possible.85  Because those who write about therapeutic jurisprudence seek 
insights from behavioral sciences, some of them have relied in part on the 
insights of social psychologists about procedural justice.86  Five articles 
have suggested changed appellate-court approaches based on insights 
from therapeutic jurisprudence;87 this Article discusses those ideas as they 
fit into the discussion here. 
Even though study of this area is limited, litigants, attorneys, and even 
the general public will form procedural-justice perceptions about appellate 
courts.  In some situations discussed here, those perceptions would not be 
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good ones.  But changes, some quite modest, would be likely to improve 
those perceptions. 
A.  Motion Practice 
Appellate courts get lots of motions.  The Kansas Court of Appeals 
gets about 10,000 each year.88  But no court is so well staffed that it could 
issue detailed written orders that show careful consideration of each of 
10,000 motions and still keep up with the rest of the work.  After all, an 
appellate court’s main task is deciding the cases based on briefing and 
argument, not figuring out all those motions. 
But I suspect that sometimes lawyers and litigants rightly wonder 
whether appellate judges are paying any attention at all to the substance of 
the motions they’ve filed.  In the Kansas Court of Appeals, rulings were 
traditionally handled by a single judge, who would write something like, 
“Accepted,” or “Denied,” or “Denied on present showing,” on the first 
page of the motion.  And that was all of the order.  If an attorney or litigant 
received such an order, how confident could they be that the court 
understood what had been requested, had respected the party’s right to ask, 
cared about the party’s substantive rights, and applied neutral principles in 
its decision?  To any who asked or thought about those questions, the 
answers wouldn’t be good ones. 
Even so, doesn’t the court have a ready excuse—that there are too 
many motions to provide detailed orders?  Maybe not.  When you look 
behind the 10,000-motion number on my former court, you would find 
that replies were filed in only about five percent of those motions.89  Thus, 
even if we assume that all motions with replies are opposed (while in fact 
some replies simply say that the other party has no objection), that means 
that only 5 percent of the court’s motions were contested.  Now you’re 
down to only about 40 motions per month that might need something more 
detailed. 
My guess is that only a few of the 40 or fewer contested motions per 
month need to have something more than the traditionally terse 
handwritten order.  In recent years, though, the judges who handle the 
court’s motions have been preparing explanatory written orders fairly 
often as they’ve deemed it appropriate.  Whether explicitly focused on 
procedural justice or not, the increased use of written orders has 
 
 88.   See Kansas Court of Appeals, Caseload Activity Summary, Fiscal Year 2019, at 3, 
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28 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69 
undoubtedly helped in public perceptions of procedural justice in the 
court’s handling of motions.  But to the extent appellate judges throughout 
the country are not yet doing so, they should start thinking more carefully 
about perceptions of procedural justice when ruling on motions.  What do 
lay people think when their attorney tells them that their motion has been 
“denied on present showing?” 
In some cases, a matter being decided by motion is significant—like a 
party’s motion for a stay pending appeal or a party’s motion to dismiss for 
lack of jurisdiction.  If the parties are represented by counsel, they may 
pay substantial attorney fees to present the issue to the court on that 
motion.  And if they get back a terse order—“The motion for a stay 
pending appeal is denied.”—what are they to think?  Perhaps the party 
seeking the stay will conclude that their attorneys didn’t know what they 
were doing.  (“How could my attorneys charge me that much money when 
the court says the matter is such a simple one it could be denied in less 
than ten words?”)  Perhaps the court misapplied the legal standard for a 
stay; if so, the losing party wouldn’t know it and thus couldn’t know to 
move for reconsideration. 
In other cases, the motion itself may not be all that significant, but a 
party still may need more than “Granted” or “Denied.”  In a recent habeas 
claim by an inmate, the Kansas Court of Appeals got a motion from the 
inmate—shortly before the posted docket date at which his case would be 
decided without argument—seeking to represent himself.  That was a 
strange request since it came well after briefing had been completed; if he 
had been dissatisfied with the briefs, he could have tried to do something 
much sooner. 
A look at the case file showed that he had previously contacted the 
court clerk’s office asking that when the decision came out a copy be sent 
to him directly (rather than relying on his attorney to send him one).  Our 
clerk had apparently denied that request, perhaps because its computer 
system wasn’t designed to send pleadings directly to represented parties.  
With that knowledge, though, his request to represent himself probably 
was just a second attempt to get the court to mail a copy of its decision 
directly to him.  Whether that was the case or not, he needed more than the 
one-word response of “Granted” or “Denied.”  And hopefully his 
satisfaction with the legal system will be higher because he got one. 
B.  Rules 
Today’s court rules have largely been drafted by lawyers and are 
intended to be used by lawyers.  Many things about court procedure are 
technical and complicated; no one expects first-year law students to take 
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on an appeal as one of their early assignments. 
But having an appellate-procedure system designed for lawyers is a 
mismatch for self-represented parties.  And more and more often, parties 
on appeal are self-represented.  In Colorado, for example, an author who 
looked into the hurdles self-represented litigants faced found that self-
represented parties were present in about a third of appeals in the Colorado 
Court of Appeals and in the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth 
Circuit.90 
The courts are of course a branch of the people’s government.  So we 
should make sure that the people can access the courts. 
Sometimes a relaxed standard is applied to self-represented parties.  
Federal courts generally give some leeway to self-represented parties 
based on the United States Supreme Court’s statement in 1972 in Haines 
v. Kerner91 that it would “hold [the complaint of a self-represented party] 
to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.”92  In 
many state courts, that’s not the case—state courts often say that the self-
represented are held to the same standards as attorneys.93  But whether a 
self-represented party gets any leeway or not, it’s easy to see how self-
represented parties would be confused by many rules of appellate 
procedure. 
As I thought about what a self-represented party might face, I thought 
back in my mind to the appeals I had handled as an attorney.  I filed one 
petition for certiorari in the United States Supreme Court.  That would 
have been daunting had there not been a former Supreme Court clerk who 
was then a fellow associate at my law firm.  But a self-represented person 
would face many hurdles—even in pursuing a state-court appeal.  The 
Missouri appellate courts have a rule, Supreme Court Rule 84.04(d), that 
prescribes a certain way a party must state the “points relied on” for the 
appeal.94  It’s the equivalent to Rule 28(a)(5) of the Federal Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, which tells you how to set out the issues on appeal 
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in a federal case.95  But Rule 84.04(d) is much more idiosyncratic, detailed, 
and picky. 
The Missouri Supreme Court did simplify the rule somewhat in a 1999 
amendment.  Before that amendment, commentators noted that 
“compliance was frequently troublesome” and “numerous appeals were 
dismissed.”96  The amended rule now includes a suggested format for 
points relied on.  For review of a trial court decision, the suggested format 
now gives everyone at least a general idea of what’s needed: 
The point shall be in substantially the following form: “The trial court 
erred in [identify the challenged ruling or action], because [state the legal 
reasons for the claim of reversible error], in that [explain why the legal 
reasons, in the context of the case, support the claim of reversible 
error].”97 
That’s helpful, especially for attorneys, but still pretty confusing for 
the self-represented.  Or so it seems.  Even under the amended rule, one of 
the three Missouri intermediate appellate courts, the Missouri Court of 
Appeals for the Western District, dismissed 13 appeals filed by self-
represented parties for failure to comply with Rule 84.04(d) between 
January 2017 and August 2020.98  The confused litigants in those cases are 
unlikely to feel that their cases were handled fairly. 
As the number of self-represented parties on appeal continues to rise, 
courts should consider whether changes in the rules could be made to make 
an appeal easier to navigate.  Rules are usually drafted by committees 
made up of lawyers.  Courts should have lay members on drafting 
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committees so that the public’s voice can be heard on the rules that affect 
the public’s right of access to the courts.  Attorneys might well find 
simplified rules helpful too. 
C.  Oral Argument 
The way a judge acts during oral argument leaves an impression about 
whether the judge genuinely seems to want to hear the litigant’s position, 
acts in a respectful manner to the parties and their attorneys, and seems 
sincerely interested in a fair resolution.  Judges can certainly argue about 
whether those are the primary purposes of oral argument.  But if the public 
is viewing the judge’s work through a procedural-justice lens, then a 
failure by appellate judges to consider this perspective when conducting 
oral argument risks alienating the public. 
Consider the views of one litigant who attended an argument in the 
United States Supreme Court.  Senator John McCain attended oral 
argument in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission.99  After the 
decision came out, McCain said that he wasn’t surprised by it: “I went over 
to observe the oral arguments . . . . It was clear that Justice[s] Roberts, 
Alito and Scalia, by their very skeptical and even sarcastic comments, 
were very much opposed to it.”100  McCain was left with the impression 
that these Justices, who McCain noted had no experience in the political 
arena, weren’t really interested in understanding the perspective of others, 
including that of the majority of both houses of Congress.101  Leaving 
impressions like that is not healthy for the court system. 
Now, one may say that this was an unusual case because most of the 
time, few, if any, members of the public come to watch appellate 
arguments.  But public access to appellate courtrooms is changing.  Most 
state supreme courts now offer streaming audio or video coverage,102 and 
a simple Google search for a judge’s name can lead to a blog or other 
nontraditional account of someone’s experience in that judge’s court. 
For those who do attend an oral argument in person, judges generally 
don’t know who the people in the gallery are.  Was the crime victim 
present when a judge made a cavalier comment?  Did the judge seem to 
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care about the case as much as how much time was left for oral argument?  
Did the judge seem to pay attention at all?  It’s easy to think of many 
situations in which judges might give attendees a bad impression of the 
court system—one that could stick with them for a very long time. 
D.  Opinions 
Appellate courts announce their decisions in written opinions.  Those 
opinions can say a lot from a procedural-justice vantage point. 
Opinions that skip over any recognition of the concerns of the parties 
may leave the impression that the court didn’t care about them, especially 
if the case ended up being decided on something that seems like a legal 
technicality, such as the statute of limitations.  Opinions written in 
something other than plain terms understood by a lay reader say that the 
court’s intended audience is lawyers, not litigants or members of the 
public. 
1.  Writing for the Lay Audience 
Judges have certainly differed over whether opinions should be 
written for a lay audience or for lawyers.  But if we think about it from a 
procedural-justice viewpoint, only opinions written for a lay audience can 
gain acceptance from someone who values procedural justice.  Can a 
litigant who finds that she can’t understand portions of the opinion really 
feel that the judge cares about her?  Will a litigant who doesn’t understand 
the explanation of the legal principles involved feel that his case has been 
decided on neutral principles rather than judicial bias disguised in 
gobbledygook? 
In most cases, the parties to the case are not lawyers.  Even when we 
look at the broader audience for judicial opinions, web access has changed 
that audience.  As an example, consider the number of people who went 
to look at Minnesota state appellate opinions during the first ten months of 
2019.  There are separate entry points for decisions of the Minnesota 
Supreme Court and the Minnesota Court of Appeals.  Each entry point had 
about 150,000 different visitors during that time.103  Those numbers could 
not have been generated just by Minnesota lawyers. 
When most of today’s appellate judges went to law school, appellate 
opinions were mostly read by lawyers.  So it was only natural that the 
 
 103.   Email from Alyssa Siems Roberson, Dir. of Pub. Affairs, Minn. Jud. Branch to Steve Leben 
& Kevin Burke (Oct. 29, 2019, 5:55 p.m.) (on file with author).  Roberson said that there had been 
154,310 visits to the Minnesota Supreme Court’s opinion page and 147,400 visits to the Minnesota 
Court of Appeals opinion page during that time frame. 
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opinions were written for lawyers.  But that’s not the state of things today.  
With ease of access, litigants and the public are reading appellate opinions.  
Their sense of procedural justice is enhanced if they understand the 
explanation for the decision and feel that the court listened to both sides.  
That sense will be diminished if they can’t understand the decision or 
conclude that the court didn’t take both sides seriously. 
Writing for the lay audience adds another value too.  Using language 
a lay person can understand will often expose flaws in legal reasoning that 
were hidden when the underlying concepts weren’t explained.  Sometimes 
a judge will find that the result that at first seemed appropriate really makes 
little sense.  It’s a rare case—if one exists—that a judge would not be able 
to explain to a high-school student, a family member, or any other non-
lawyer if the judge really made that a goal for every opinion. 
2.  The Opinion as a Letter to the Loser 
Writers from the field of therapeutic jurisprudence have suggested that 
courts make at least part of the opinion speak directly to the losing party.  
Nathalie Des Rosiers first made this suggestion in an article she wrote 
about a decision of the Supreme Court of Canada on a very divisive issue, 
Quebec secession.104  To show respect, Des Rosiers suggested that part of 
the court’s opinion should essentially be a “letter to the loser.”105 
 Despite the contentious nature of Quebec secession, the court’s 
decision was well received.106  Des Rosiers attributed that in part to how 
the court addressed in a respectful manner the issues raised by the losing 
party.107 
The court acknowledged the complexity of the problem and the 
reasons each side offered so that “democracy [was] enhanced by the 
confrontation of reasons why one group should prevail over another.”108  
Many United States judges could benefit from her advice to avoid 
demeaning the losing party:  “A language that destroys one participant 
serves to exacerbate his or her sense of having been exploited, of being 
misunderstood, and of having no hope of being respected.”109 
Making sure that the losing party feels respected was the focus for 
Amy Ronner, a law professor who has run a clinic in which law students 
 
 104.   Des Rosiers, supra note 87, at 54, 56.  
 105.   Id. at 56. 
 106.   Id. at 61. 
 107.   Id. at 61–62. 
 108.   Id. at 57.  
 109.   Id. 
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represented indigent parties on criminal appeals, and Bruce Winick.110  
They have contrasted two ways appellate courts handle these cases.111  In 
some, the court enters a short per curiam affirmance.112  In those cases, the 
court provides no discussion of the facts, no disclosure of the court’s 
reasoning, and, in Ronner and Winick’s view, “no sense of validation” to 
the losing party that the losing party’s claims were fairly heard.113 
In other cases, the court issues at least a short opinion explaining its 
decision. As Ronner and Winick note, even when the court must give a 
party an adverse decision, it still can “let individuals know that their 
arguments have been fairly and fully considered.”114 
An appellate court shows that it has listened by noting at least the 
party’s main points somewhere in the court’s opinion.115  Instead of the 
per curiam affirmance, Ronner and Winick recommend that the court issue 
a very short written opinion that still notes the key facts, mentions at least 
some of the arguments, and explains why precedent calls for the result 
reached by the court.116  From a procedural-justice perspective, that’s a 
much better practice. 
Wexler has endorsed the “letter to the loser” recommendation to make 
sure litigants feel that their voice has been heard.117  He chose one of my 
opinions as an example.118 
My court had a case in which a man who now lives in Africa had filed 
a court case to set aside the adoption of his biological son.119  This was not 
his first visit to the Kansas court system, and his new claim was barred by 
res judicata.  But the district court had already told him that before he 
appealed; in his appeal, he listed 21 reasons he said the district court had 
erred.120  He filed a 45-page initial brief and a 12-page reply brief.121 
The Kansas Court of Appeals’ majority opinion told him that he had 
“fail[ed] to present a single reason why the district court erred in denying 
his motion as res judicata,” but it neither addressed his separate claims nor 
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explained the concepts beyond res-judicata rules.122  The opinion was no 
doubt typical, though, of how most courts in the United States would 
resolve such a case: it provided the basic factual background, and it told 
the litigants that the father’s attempt to reopen the adoption more than four 
years after it had been court-approved was too late and barred by the 
doctrine of res judicata.123 
I was concerned, though, that he would have no idea what res judicata 
meant.  So I wrote a six-paragraph concurring opinion (one that with minor 
revision could have served as the court’s opinion).124  Wexler thought it 
provided an example of how appellate courts might tailor an opinion to 
focus on procedural-justice concepts through plain English and an 
explanation of the concepts at issue: 
The history of N.M.’s sporadic appearances in the Kansas court system 
to reassert claims that he previously had abandoned suggests that he may 
not understand some of the overriding legal principles we must follow.  
I offer this concurring opinion in the hope that he may yet understand 
them.  See Ronner, Therapeutic Jurisprudence on Appeal, 37 Ct. Rev. 
64 (Spring 2000). 
The American court system works hard to ensure that court proceedings 
involving children are resolved in as short a time frame as possible.  We 
recognize that children deserve an answer to the most basic questions 
about their lives—like, who are my parents?  Where will I live?—within 
a time frame that is reasonable as judged from a child’s viewpoint. 
The ultimate need for legal disputes to be resolved, so that people may 
get on with their lives and business affairs, is also the driving force 
behind the legal doctrine called res judicata.  Under res judicata, when a 
dispute has been decided in a final court judgment, the same issues may 
not be relitigated in a later suit.  That allows parties to go on about their 
business based on the court’s final judgment without worrying that some 
later court action might yet revisit the same issues. 
The court’s opinion has correctly held that res judicata applies here.  
N.M.’s parental rights were terminated by the district court in its January 
2003 ruling.  N.M. appealed, but when he dismissed that appeal, the 
district court’s ruling terminating his parental rights became a final 
judgment.  And after that, the proposed adoptive parents proceeded with 
their adoption of B.M.J.F. based upon the final judgment, which 
terminated N.M.’s parental rights.  So res judicata prevents further 
litigation over the matter. 
Even if some exception to the res judicata rule were available—and I am 
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not aware of one—this is exactly the sort of case in which we would be 
reluctant to apply it.  This child has lived with the adoptive family from 
a few days after his birth in 2002 until now.  From the time the adoption 
was finalized in October 2004 until N.M. filed pleadings in April 2009 
seeking to reopen the case, the child’s family knew that there was a final 
judgment terminating N.M.’s parental rights and an order of adoption in 
place.  When we look at this situation from the standpoint of the child, 
he has had only one home and one family.  He and his family have a right 
to rely upon the finality of the 2003 ruling terminating N.M.’s parental 
rights, a judgment that became final when N.M. voluntarily dismissed 
his appeal in 2004. 
N.M.’s continued interest in his biological son is understandable, 
perhaps even laudable.  But no matter its sincerity, it is no longer an 
interest that Kansas law can force this 8-year-old boy’s adoptive parents 
to respond to.125 
Obviously, I wasn’t able to convince all the judges who served on 
appellate panels with me to apply procedural-justice principles in every 
case; after all, I wrote a concurrence, not the court’s opinion.  Truth be 
told, the difference here represents a real and reasonable point on which 
judges may disagree.  An intermediate appellate court has a busy docket; 
its judges simply can’t take the time to write every opinion as if it were the 
United States Supreme Court.  Compromises often must be made between 
the dual goals of timeliness and thoroughness.  But judges often could do 
more to make clear to losing litigants that, even though their key 
arguments had been heard, the court concluded that other considerations 
required a different result. 
3.  Addressing the Bigger Picture 
Sometimes a court must not only address the losing party’s arguments 
but must also place that argument into a larger context.  The former chief 
judge of the Tenth Circuit, Deanell Tacha, argues that citizens lack a basic 
understanding of how our government works and urges that judges help 
solve this by becoming “painters of the ‘big picture.’”126  While she 
primarily suggested speeches to civic clubs, presentations in schools, and 
other general education efforts,127 focusing on the big picture in opinions 
would also help in many cases from a procedural-justice perspective. 
That’s because we want parties and the public to understand the 
explanation a court’s opinion provides about why the decision was made.  
 
 125.   Id.  
 126.   Deanell Reece Tacha, Renewing Our Civic Commitment: Lawyers and Judges as Painters 
of the “Big Picture”, 41 U. KAN. L. REV. 481, 488 (1993). 
 127.   Id. at 488–89. 
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Without that understanding, they can’t assess the procedural fairness of 
the opinion.  But without a grasp of the big picture—which they may well 
lack—they won’t understand the true basis for the opinion. 
A typical example would be a habeas corpus claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel.  The defendant is seeking to overturn a jury’s 
verdict, and there are usually victims or family members of victims who 
will be upset if the guilty verdict is set aside.  Sometimes, though, setting 
the guilty verdict aside is necessary: when a trial error leaves the appellate 
court in doubt that the verdict was fair, the court must set it aside and order 
a new trial.128  But if the court’s opinion merely states the legal standards 
to be applied—without an explanation of why they’re in place—the 
victims and the public may not understand why the decision was made. 
There might be as many ways to address painting the big picture in 
such a case as there are judges, so my suggestions are just one option.  In 
a dissent, I tried this first paragraph to put the case into context: 
Our criminal-justice system uses the adversarial process to seek truth and 
provide fairness.  On one side stands the government—with police 
officers and sheriff’s deputies, crime labs, fingerprint and DNA 
databases, and prosecutors.  On the other stands the defendant.  This 
justice system works—providing a fair process to seek just results—only 
if the defendant has reasonably effective representation too.129 
My hope was that such an introduction would set the stage for the 
reader to understand why, given the inadequacy of the representation 
provided, a new trial really was needed—even though the crime was 
especially cruel and gruesome. 
Another simple big-picture item that often comes up in criminal 
appeals is the statement of the standard of review.  Because the person has 
been convicted, either in a trial to a judge or a jury, the appellate court 
must look at the facts in the light most favorable to the government.130  
After all, the fact-finder found in the government’s favor. 
But the way a court states that standard of review might make a lot of 
difference to the reader.  For example, the Kansas Supreme Court 
frequently says that it “must determine whether, in a light most favorable 
to the prosecution, a rational fact-finder could have found [the defendant] 
 
 128.   See, e.g., Wilson v. State, 340 P.3d 1213, 1230 (Kan. Ct. App. 2014).  
 129.   Baker v. State, 457 P.3d 183, 196 (Kan. Ct. App. 2019) (Leben, J., dissenting).  
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reviewed, but not reweighed, to determine if there is sufficient support for the district court’s factual 
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guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”131  Think about how a defendant and 
the defendant’s family and supporters would feel when reading that the 
court has affirmed a guilty verdict and long sentence by taking all the facts 
in the light most favorable to the prosecution.  Unless the court explains 
why it does so—that the facts were determined by the jury, for example, 
and the appellate court is not the finder of fact—the defendant may at least 
initially feel that the court was biased in favor of the prosecution.  
Explaining the big picture in a situation like this both helps educate 
everyone about how our system works and improves the understanding of 
the opinion necessary to a feeling of fair treatment. 
IV.  THE SPECIAL CASE OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 
Earlier in this Article, I reviewed the data on diminished perceptions 
of legitimacy and trust for the United States Supreme Court.132  This 
should matter to the Court; our judicial system as a whole needs its highest 
court to be well-respected.  From a procedural-justice perspective, three 
focal points come into view: (1) opening the Court’s oral arguments to 
television; (2) writing opinions that explain the big picture for the lay 
reader; and (3) providing a better explanation when the Court handles 
matters through what’s commonly called its “shadow docket.” 
A.  Opening Oral Arguments to Television 
Most state supreme courts now routinely provide live-streams or 
broadcasts of their oral arguments; so do many federal courts of appeal.133  
But the United States Supreme Court, the world’s most powerful court, 
normally does not.134  From a procedural-justice vantage point, the Court 
is therefore not transparent to all but a sliver of the population, the people 
who are lucky enough to get a seat in the courtroom for an argument.  The 
Court does release audio recordings and transcripts.135  But our modern 
society does not access information through same-day transcripts and 
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audio recordings released even later, as the Court’s normal procedures 
provide.136 
The Court did make a limited exception to its access rules during the 
Covid-19 pandemic.  Since the Court wasn’t able to convene in person—
either with all the Justices together or with counsel—the Court had to turn 
to some form of electronic access to hold oral arguments at all.137  While 
most state supreme courts opted for a videoconferencing solution, such as 
Zoom, the United States Supreme Court used an audio conference call, 
and the Court made that audio stream accessible to the media and the 
public.138  “Millions of people listened,”139 and public-opinion surveys 
showed broad support for live access to the Court’s proceedings.140 
Procedural-justice research shows that procedural concerns are 
important in the evaluation of authorities and institutions.141  Tyler and 
another researcher found a connection in some 1987 survey data between 
the public’s impression of the Court’s procedural fairness and the public’s 
view of the Court’s legitimacy.142  So there’s reason to believe that 
improving perceptions of fairness would lead to a better sense that the 
Court’s authority is legitimate. 
Opening oral arguments to public broadcast could help.  The Court 
had a chance to show the public that its process was fair when it heard the 
first cases over the Affordable Care Act in 2012.143  The Court set aside 
three days for oral argument, and the nation’s 24-hour news cycle focused 
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on the cases.144  When asked, members of the public overwhelmingly 
favored having those hearings televised.145  But the public had no ability 
to hear the arguments—or even excerpts of them during those news cycles.  
The public had no chance to see for itself whether the Court had provided 
fair hearings. 
Had they been broadcast, I’ve argued that the public’s perception of 
the hearings would have been positive.146  Minneapolis trial judge Kevin 
Burke and I looked at the justices’ performance during those oral 
arguments.147  On the whole, we found that the justices acted even-
handedly and asked appropriate questions of both sides.148  That was 
especially true for the two most critical members of the Court, Chief 
Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., who presided, and Justice Anthony Kennedy, 
widely regarded then as the key swing vote for most cases on the Court.149 
The Court has the ability at oral argument—if televised—to 
demonstrate to the public that it is sincerely interested in the parties’ 
arguments and trying to decide the case based on neutral principles.150  If 
the performance of justices does not show that, justices would have a 
chance to learn that; commentators, both academic and otherwise, would 
no doubt provide feedback. 
The main arguments made against broadcasting the arguments are that 
attorneys or justices might change their behavior and that the public might 
be misled as excerpts are broadcast.151  But state courts have not had a 
problem with grandstanding attorneys (or justices).152  And members of 
the public who wanted to watch the Court’s hearings in full (and many no 
doubt would) could do so on CSPAN or on the web.  That video clips may 
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be used—and might have snippets that put Justices in a bad light—is no 
different than having audio clips used now, albeit on a delayed basis, or 
having the media simply choose what is most important in the story, as 
they must do to report it. 
B.  Writing Opinions That Better Explain the Big Picture 
The earlier discussion about explaining the big picture153 applies even 
more to the Supreme Court.  And one of its well-publicized opinions, Kelo 
v. City of New London,154 is a good example. 
Kelo, which upheld a city’s use of its eminent-domain power,155  was 
one of the Court’s most unpopular decisions in recent decades.  One of the 
two times the Gallup Poll approval of the Court has dipped to 42% came 
in the immediate aftermath of the Kelo decision.156 
When one looks at the Kelo opinion, it reads like a typical legal 
discussion of abstract concepts.  Perhaps had it been written more for the 
lay reader—and emphasized the leeway that a court must give to elected 
officials—the negative public reaction might have been lessened.157  After 
all, the Court’s decision simply left in place a decision that had been made 
by local elected officials.158 
Although it came up in a trial court, I had a case that shows at least in 
part how this might be handled.  The case involved the “appeal of a city’s 
approval of a large auto mall in one of the Kansas-side suburbs of Kansas 
City.  The appeal was filed by neighboring property owners and their 
homeowners association, each of [which] had opposed the rezoning before 
the city commission.”159  In Kansas, reviews of a city commission decision 
like this came to the trial court. 
In a 15-page written opinion, along with noting that I had reviewed 
the full 2,600-page administrative record, I devoted a full page of the 
opinion to a discussion of the role of a court in zoning matters.160  I began 
by explaining that elected officials had made the decision: 
We live in a democracy in which many of the important decisions to be 
made that affect our lives are rightly to be made by our elected officials.  
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Although the consideration by a city council of a rezoning request is 
deemed a quasi-judicial proceeding, the initial decision is to be made by 
elected officials, not judges.  It is in the making of that initial decision 
that a great deal of discretion exists.  In a given case, it might well be a 
reasonable decision either to grant or to deny the requested rezoning, and 
the decision would depend upon the elected body’s preferences for its 
city’s development.161 
That introduction set the stage for further discussion of the court’s 
formal standard of review, under which the elected body makes a decision 
that must be upheld unless it is well beyond the range of potentially 
reasonable decisions.162 
In Kelo, as in that case, a court was deferring to local elected 
officials—within legal limits.163  Many people who would be upset by 
eminent-domain powers or by an auto mall coming into their 
neighborhood might well agree that, on balance, they wouldn’t want courts 
to interfere with the judgments of their elected officials unless truly 
necessary.  In each case, part of the court’s job should be explaining how 
our system works and where the court’s role properly resides. 
Painting that big picture lets the public put the court’s decision in 
context.  And without context, the decision is likely not going to be well 
understood.  Procedural justice demands good explanations of decisions. 
C.  Better Explanations on the “Shadow Docket” 
If good explanations are needed, that surely is the case on the Supreme 
Court’s so-called shadow docket.  The shadow docket is the Court’s 
version of motion practice and summary decisions that don’t get full 
briefing or oral argument.164  Good explanations are needed because the 
Court is making important decisions here. 
Some of these decisions are literally life-and-death matters in death 
penalty cases.  In one 2019 decision, the Court entered a five-to-four order 
lifting a stay of execution in a death-penalty case, Dunn v. Ray.165  Justice 
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Kagan, joined by three others, issued a strong dissent.166  But the 
majority’s opinion—letting the execution proceed immediately—said 
only this: 
The application to vacate the stay of execution of sentence of death 
entered by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit 
on February 6, 2019, presented to Justice THOMAS and by him referred 
to the Court, is granted. 
On November 6, 2018, the State scheduled Domineque Ray’s execution 
date for February 7, 2019.  Because Ray waited until January 28, 2019 
to seek relief, we grant the State’s application to vacate the stay entered 
by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.  See 
Gomez v. United States Dist. Court for Northern Dist. of Cal., 503 U.S. 
653, 654, 112 S.Ct. 1652, 118 L.Ed.2d 293 (1992) (per curiam) (“A court 
may consider the last-minute nature of an application to stay execution 
in deciding whether to grant equitable relief.”).167 
The same thing happened a few weeks later in Dunn v. Price.168  
Justice Breyer, joined by three others, issued a dissent.169  But the 
majority’s opinion allowing the execution to proceed said only this: 
The application to vacate the stay of execution, presented to Justice 
THOMAS and by him referred to the Court, is granted, and the stays 
entered by the District Court for the Southern District of Alabama and 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit on April 11, 
2019, are vacated.  In June 2018, death-row inmates in Alabama whose 
convictions were final before June 1, 2018, had 30 days to elect to be 
executed via nitrogen hypoxia. Ala. Code § 15-18-82.1(b)(2).  Price, 
whose conviction became final in 1999, did not do so, even though the 
record indicates that all death-row inmates were provided a written 
election form, and 48 other death-row inmates elected nitrogen hypoxia.  
He then waited until February 2019 to file this action and submitted 
additional evidence today, a few hours before his scheduled execution 
time.  See Gomez v. United States Dist. Court for Northern Dist. of Cal., 
503 U.S. 653, 654, 112 S.Ct. 1652, 118 L.Ed.2d 293 (1992) (per curiam) 
(“A court may consider the last-minute nature of an application to stay 
execution in deciding whether to grant equitable relief.”).170 
In matters of this importance, it’s hard for the public to see procedural 
fairness in this kind of a proceeding. 
A few days before Price, in another five-to-four death-penalty case, 
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members of the Court expanded on the reasons for these types of rulings.171  
But that would be of no use, obviously, to the men already executed.  And 
it would not erase the public perception that came from the largely 
unexplained exercise of great discretion. 
In an article coauthored by former Texas Supreme Court Chief Justice 
Wallace B. Jefferson, former California state court administrator William 
C. Vickrey, and California state judiciary analyst Douglas D. Denton, 
those authors outline the role a state high court has in explaining its 
decisions.172  Recognizing that opinions of the state court system will be 
affected by public impressions about its opinions, they urge writing key 
portions of the opinion (including the opening) in plain language; 
including a summary in any long opinion; and having good 
communications with the media to help in publicizing opinions.173  The 
summary opinions quoted above from the Supreme Court in these death-
penalty cases are far from the best practices Jefferson, Vickrey, and 
Denton have recommended for state high courts.  The Supreme Court 
should consider the procedural-justice perceptions its handling of the 
shadow docket creates. 
CONCLUSION 
Given the relatively low level of public trust in institutions and the 
courts today, courts should consider taking steps likely to improve the 
public sense of the courts’ legitimacy.  At least at the trial level and on an 
overall basis, adherence to procedural-justice principles is shown to 
improve trust in courts and judges.  While we do not have studies focused 
on groups of litigants in specific appellate courts, it’s reasonable to think 
that adherence to procedural-justice principles would work similarly for 
appellate courts.  The suggestions made in this Article would be sensible 
ones for courts to consider. 
Of course, procedural-justice concepts aren’t by themselves an 
adequate checklist of what judges or a justice system must do.  In addition 
to procedural aspects, courts and judges still need to get the outcome right.  
And they must process cases expeditiously, which is not an explicit 
procedural-justice construct.  But if we want the public to perceive courts 
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